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REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS: AN OLD
BUSINESS FORM REVITALIZED
WILLIAM B. DOCKSER*
On September 10, 1960, sections 856, 857 and 858 were added10
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, effective with the taxable year
beginning in 1961.1 These sections established a new federal tax entity
called Real Estate Investment Trusts. Since the passage of Public Law
86-779, there has been great interest in Real Estate Investment Trusts
and a sizable number have been formed,2 but this number is small com-
pared to the formation of Small Business Investment Companies follow-
ing the Small Business Investment Act of 1958' and the development
of Mutual Funds after the Investment Company Act of 1940." The
relatively limited use of Real Estate Investment Trusts is due to a
number of factors which will be explored and discussed in this paper.
In recent months REITs have achieved widespread acceptance and are
now appearing in the investment market with great regularity. This
* Member of the Massachusetts Bar; A.B., Harvard, 1959; LL.B., Yale, 1962. I am
indebted to Professor Guido Calabresi of Yale Law School, who constantly assisted me in
finding the errors of my logic. What remains is my own inadequate offering to legal
scholarship. I would also like to acknowledge an unmeasurable debt to my wife, Carole Ann
Dockser, who not only proofread countless drafts, but who also forsook normal living so that
I could complete this paper.
1. Pub. L. No. 779, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. The history of previous bills is discussed in
1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 436, 440, and Durrett, The Real Estate Investment Trust-A New
Medium for Investors, 3 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 140, 143 (1961).
2. As of July 1962, fifty-seven Real Estate Investment Trusts (hereafter, REITs)
were formed following the passage of the Real Estate Investment Trust Act of 1960. All
of these REITs are listed in a later section of this paper.
3. 72 Stat. 689, 15 U.S:C. § 661 (1958). John E. Home, Administrator of the Small
Business Administration, reported in a speech on June 9, 1961, that there were 265 SBICs
in operation at that time. Phil David Fine, Deputy Administrator of the Small Business
Administration, places the number of SBICs at 407 as of October 31, 1961. Fine & Fisher,
The Impact of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 on Small Business Financing in
New England, 45 MASs. L.Q. 363 (1961). It is obvious from these two figures that SBICs
are being formed at a rapid rate.
4. 54 Stat.. 789, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1958). The New York Times throughout the month
of July 1962 listed almost 200 "mutual funds" in its Financial Section and gave their
daily bid and ask quotations. To the best of my knowledge, the New York Times lists
only one REIT and that is one that has been traded on the American Stock Exchange for
a number of years.
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paper attempts to explain the REIT as a tax entity and as a form of
real estate investment.
The business trust is not well known or understood outside of a
few sophisticated communities, in particular Boston and Chicago, and
there are few attorneys and business people who have had experience
with this form of investment.' The business trust form has historically
been used in a limited number of states, particularly through the East
and a few central states; its use is even forbidden in some states.
A discussion of the business trust as it has developed is fundamental
to an understanding of what Congress intended when it passed the Real
Estate Investment Trust Act, since this was the form that was intended
to be used under the Act. A discussion of the tax aspects of REITs will
follow; then a discussion of the present and future activities of REITs
and their relation to the real estate and investment fields in general.
I. REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS AS AN ENTITY
A. The Business or Massachusetts Trust
A business trust has been defined by the United States Supreme
Court as,
a "form of business organization, common in that State
[Massachusetts], consisting essentially of an arrangement
whereby property is conveyed to trustees, in accordance with
the terms of an instrument of trust, to be held and managed for
the benefit of such persons as may from time to time be the
holders of transferable certificates issued by the trustees show-
ing the shares into which the beneficial interest in property is
divided."'
The business trust, as we now know it, had its origins in the middle
eighteen hundreds, when Massachusetts law made it difficult to secure
a charter for the development of real estate without an act of the legis-
lature (General Court) 7 Corporations were not allowed to own real
5. Chicago lawyers have had a great many dealings with the so called "Illinois Land
Trust" over the years, which is a very common form of land ownership in Chicago, par-
ticularly of slum property. Boston lawyers originated the business trust and are well
versed in its structure, problems and uses. Business trusts have been and remain a com-
mon form of real estate ownership in Massachusetts.
6. Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 146 (1924). See Annot., 156 A.L.R. 27, n.3 (1924)
for a discussion of definitions of business trusts. In a note in 37 YALE L.J. 1103, 1105
(1928) the "Massachusetts trust" is defined in a similar manner as the Hecht case def-
inition. "The term 'Massachusetts trust,' otherwise known as the 'business' or 'common
law' trust is used generally to denote an unincorporated organization created for profit
under a written instrument or declaration of trust, the management to be conducted by
compensated trustees for the benefit of persons whose legal interests are represented by
transferable certificates of participation or shares."
7. "It has been said that this method of conducting a commerdal enterprise originated
in this Commonwealth as a result of the inability to secure charters for acquiring and
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estate as an investment. This meant that there could be no real estate
corporations as such; thus the trust form had to be used. As early as
1854, a Massachusetts case noted the existence of the trust form for the
purchase of real estate.8 The largest real estate investment trust in
existence today traces its inception to the Boston Real Estate Trust
formed in 1886.1 This type of organization was used extensively for the
development of Greater Boston real estate, and its use was copied in other
fields outside of real estate.'" The business trust was given an amazing
variety of uses until it came into general disfavor." There were numer-
ous advantages to the trust form,'2 and as corporations became more
regulated and taxed, it appeared that the trust form might overtake and
replace the corporate form, but this trend was reversed by subsequent
events.
It was apparent that business trusts actively engaged in business
were reaping a large tax advantage over corporations engaged in the
same type of activities.' 3 In 1935, the Supreme Court resolved this
problem in Morrissey v. Commissioner.4 Justice Hughes wrote that if
(1) there are two or more individuals in a joint enterprise, and (2) it
resembles a corporation, and (3) the purpose of this enterprise is carry-
ing on business for profit, then this organization is an association taxable
as a corporation.' From this point on there has been little active move-
developing real estate without a special act of the Legislature." State St. Trust Co. v.
Hall, 311 Mass. 299, 41 N.E.2d 30 (1942). See also 21 YALE L.J. 311, 312 (1911); 37 YALE
L.J. 1103, 1106 (1928).
8. In Attorney Gen. v. Federal St. Meetinghouse, 46 Mass. (3 Gray) 1 (1854) the
court referred to companies "formed without incorporation, consisting of numerous num-
bers for the purchase of wild lands, with a view to a resale or other like purposes," where
"the grant is made to trustees in trust for several members designated, and a certificate
of such right to an aliquot part of the beneficial interest is usually issued by the trustees
to several parties, indicating what aliquot part each holds in such trust property or bene-
ficial interest . .. .
9. The Boston Real Estate Trust was formed in 1886 with a capital of $2,000,000.
This is the predecessor of the Real Estate Investment Trust of America. See Gardiner,
Real Estate Investment Trusts, 100 TRUSTS & ESTATES 614 (1961) for a discussion of the
origins of real estate trusts and its effect upon present REITs.
10. These trusts were largely responsible for the development of a number of middle
and far west cities, namely Detroit, Chicago, Minneapolis, St. Paul, Kansas City, Omaha,
Duluth and Seattle. See Kilpatrick, Taxation of Real Estate Investment Trusts and Their
Shareholders, 39 TAXES 1042 (1961).
11. For discussions of the almost unbelievable uses of business trusts see 37 YALE L.J.
1103, 1106 (1928); 16 ILL. L. REV. 370 (1921); 15 LAW. & BANK. 205 (1885); Annots.,
156 A.L.R. 29 and 156 A.L.R. 80, 81 (1942).
12. Besides the obvious federal tax advantages for which trusts were initially used so
extensively, there were other advantages. Among these are comparative freedom from
state regulation, avoidance of state corporate taxes, freedom of members from personal
liability, continuation of the trust after members die, members avoiding association with
the property through the intervention of the trustees holding title and the ready transfer-
ability of shares. There are advantages to the business trust when compared to either the
corporate or the partnership forms of doing business.
13. Durrett, supra note 1, at 142, 143.
14. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
15. Durrett, supra note 1, at 143; Kilpatrick, supra note 10, at 1044.
1962]
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ment to use the trust form rather than the corporate business form, ex-
cept in the few instances where there is a particular business reason for
so doing.
A body of law has developed on many phases of the law of business
trusts, particularly in Massachusetts and Illinois. It is generally held
that, in the absence of a statute, a business trust need have no limit on
the duration of its existence.18 The Rule Against Perpetuities is not vio-
lated by a business trust, since these rules are directed against remote-
ness of vesting and with the business trust all interests are vested im-
mediately in the holders of the transferable certificates of interest..It is
also generally held that both the beneficiaries and the trustees can limit
their respective liabilities and force creditors to look solely to the prop-
erty of the trust for the settlement of their claims. 8 By the very nature
of the trust arrangement, the shareholder-beneficiaries have only limited
control over the trustees; usually these powers include election and re-
moval of the trustees within the terms of the trust instrument itself 19 and
the power, as defined by the trust instrument, to amend or terminate
the trust.20  Care must be taken to keep the shareholder-beneficiaries'
powers limited so that the trust cannot be viewed as a partnership and
lose its limited liability.2 ' Compensation, duties, powers and restric-
tions of the trustees are generally governed by the trust instrument,
but since the trust is a creature of equity, a reasonableness doctrine
generally applies. 22 The trustee of the business trust occupies a fiduciary
16. Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Sullivan, 103 Okla. 78, 229 Pac. 561 (1924) (definite pe-
riod, or twenty-one years, or life or lives of beneficiaries); Hart v. Seymour, 147 II. 598,
35 N.E. 246 (1893) (no limit); Howe v. Morse, 174 Mass. 491, 55 N.E. 213 (1899) (life or
lives in being plus twenty-one years) ; Hodgkiss v. Northland Petroleum Consol., 104
Mont. 328, 67 P.2d 811 (1937) (lives of trustees plus twenty-one years); Baker v. Stem,
194 Wis. 233, 216 N.W. 147, 58 A.L.R. 462 (1927) (no limit).
17. Hart v. Seymour, supra note 16. See also Committee on Partnerships & Unincor-
porated Business Ass'ns, Real Estate Investment Trusts, 16 Bus. LAw. 900, 912 (1961);
Annot., 158 A.L.R. 76 (1945).
18. Gallagher v. Hannigan, 5 F.2d 171 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 269 US. 573, appeal
dismissed, 273 U.S. 667 (1927); Rothbart v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 307 II. App. 271,
30 N.E.2d 183 (1940); Industrial Lumber Co. v. Texas Pine Land Ass'n, 31 Tex. Civ. App.
375, 72 S.W. 875 (1903). See RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS § 271 (1959); Annot., 156 A.L.R. 85,
104 (1945). See also Committee on Partnerships & Unincorporated Business Ass'ns, supra
note 17, at 910.
19. See discussion at 156 A.L.R. 85, 93, 105 (1945).
20. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Copeland, 39 R.I. 193, 98 Atl. 273 (1916). See
also Magruder, The Position of Shareholders in Business Trusts, 23 CoLum. L. REv. 423,
437 (1923); Annot., 156 A.L.R. 118 (1945).
21. Goldwater v. Oltman, 210 Cal. 408, 292 Pac. 624 (1930); Whitman v. Porter, 107
Mass. 522 (1871); Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Sullivan, 103 Okla. 78, 229 Pac. 561 (1924);
Feldman v. American Dist. Telegraph Co., 257 S.W. 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). This
problem is discussed further under the "State Law" section of this paper. See also 37 YALE
L.J. 1103, 1112 (1928). This problem of a trust becoming a partnership by the exercise of
too much power in the shareholders is a subject that requires lawyers in each state to
carefully consider their particular state law.
22. Courts of equity have long overseen the activity of trusts, and trustees are always
responsible to the court for their conduct. See Mitchell v. Ormond, 282 Mass. 107, 184
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relationship to the shareholder-beneficiary and the trustee must use the
measure of care and diligence that would be exercised by a man of ordi-
nary prudence and skill in the management of his own estate.' The
trustee is not an insurer, but generally is personally liable for mal-
feasance, gross negligence, fraud or wanton misconduct.24 He is relieved
from personal liability if there is a clause in the trust instrument, effective
under the appropriate state law, so relieving him.25
B. State Law
In order to have a valid business trust, the trust must have an
independent existence and be recognized by state law. A few states have
prohibitions on the creation of express trusts for specified purposes, in-
cluded in these are real estate investment trusts. These states include
Montana,26 North Dakota, 7 and South Dakota.28 Several states have in
recent years amended their statutes so that real estate investment trusts
would qualify under them. Among these are California,2 Michigan, °
Minnesota,"' Washington, 2 Wisconsin8" and New York. 4 Other states,
such as Florida, allow for business trusts but the statutes are sparse 5
and the case decisions36 do not disclose a great deal. as to what activities
N.E. 471 (1933); Woodke v. Procknow, 238 Wis. 422, 300 N.W. 173 (1941). In Walker
v. Close, 98 Fla. 1103, 1112, 125 So. 521, 525 (1929), rehearing denied, 98 Fla. 1125, 126
So. 289 (1930), the court said: "A reasonable compensation should be allowed to trustees
for their services, care and responsibility incident to their position." Compensation of the
trustees on the basis of a percentage of the profits of the trust (which is the typical REIT
arrangement) was allowed in Dunbar v. Redfield, 7 Cal. 2d 515, 61 P.2d 744 (1936); Beltz
v. Griggs, 137 Kan. 429, 20 P.2d 510 (1933).
23. Austin v. Parker, 137 Ill. 348, 148 N.E. 19 (1925); Downey Co. v. 282 Beacon St.
Trust, 292 Mass. 175, 197 N.E. 643 (1935); Ashley v. Winkley, 209 Mass. 509, 95 N.E.
932 (1911).
24. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 164 (1959).
25. Palmer v. Taylor, 168 Ark. 127, 269 S.W. 996 (1925); Goldwater v. Oltman, 210
Cal. 408, 292 Pac. 624 (1930); Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, 328 Ill. 321, 159 N.E. 250
(1927); Hamilton v. Young, 116 Kan. 128, 225 Pac. 1045 (1924); Dunning v. Gibbs, 213
Ky. 81, 280 S.W. 483 (1926); Boyle v. Rider, 136 Md. 286, 110 At. 524 (1920); Shoe &
Leather Nat'l Bank v. Dix, 123 Mass. 148 (1877); William Lindeke Land Co. v. Kalman,
190 Minn. 601, 252 N.W.- 650 (1934); George v. Hall, 262 S.W. 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
In most states a provision relieving the trustee from personal liability in the trust instru-
ment is not against public' policy, but there are cases to the contrary, particularly in
reference to tort liability. See Sleeper v. Park, 232 Mass. 292, 122 N.E. 315 (19,19)
Fisheries Co. v. McCoy, 202 S.W. 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
26. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 86-105, 86-206 (1947).
27. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-03-02 (1960).
28. S.D. CODE § 59.0301 (1939).
29. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2220 (1937).
0. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.61 (1948).
1. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501.11 (1947).
32. WASH. REV. CODE § 23.90 (1959). But see 16 Bus. LAW. 902 (1961) for problems
arising under the Washington "Massachusetts Trusts Act of 1959."
33. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 231.01 (1957).
34. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 96(7). See also N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 42(d); N.Y.
PERS. PROP. LAW § 11(c).
35. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 609 (1956).
36. The early cases of Willey v. W. J. Hoggson Corp., 90 Fla. 343, 106 So. 408 (1925),
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are allowable and what are not.3 7  There remains a large number of
states in which the validity of a business trust for real estate investment
is either in doubt or the courts appear hostile to them. s Of course, there
are also a number of states which have long recognized the validity of
the business trust for real estate and have laws to regulate the business
trust as an entity. Among these are Illinoiss3a Massachusetts39 and
Oklahoma.40
As of March 27, 1962, thirty-nine REITs had filed with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission. 4' These trusts were created under the
following state laws: California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania and Texas. The status of the state law on the creation
of business trusts is by no means clear in all of these states. Some states
are enacting legislation to allow REITs to be formed under state law,
whereas before the legislation the REIT would have been unable to
exist independently. As of August 28, 1961, a new law became effective
in Texas when that state's legislature passed the "Texas Real Estate In-
vestment Trust Act.
' 42
As of July, 1962 there were 67 REITs throughout the United States.
These trusts are concentrated in a few states; over three-fourths of
them are located in nine jurisdictions. By far the greater number of
these trusts were formed in the following states: Massachusetts (15),
District of Columbia (7), New York (6), California (5), Colorado (5)
and Pennsylvania (5). Several trusts have avoided registration with the
SEC by limiting their offering to one state. This has been done by
fairly small trusts in California, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Nebraska,
and Drew v. Hobbs, 104 Fla. 427, 140 So. 211 (1932), seem to be confused in holding the
trustees liable under declarations of trust. Walker v. Close, 98 Fla. 1103, 125 So. 521
(1929), recognized the business trust in Florida. In Silliman, Partnership--The Uniform Act
and the Florida Law, 5 U. FLA. L. Rav. 281, 290 (1952), it is stated that "Florida, after an
apparently false start . . . finally saw the light . . . recognized a business trust for what
it is."
37. 5 FLA. Ju-. Business Trusts §§ 1-3 (1955). Also 16 Bus. LAW. 900, 905 (1961),
discusses the earlier cases under Florida law.
38. Ariz.: Rubens v. Costello, 75 Ariz. 5, 251 P.2d 306 (1952); Kan.: Fitch v. United
Royalty -Co., 143 Kan. 486, 55 P.2d 409 (1936) ; Tex., prior to August 28, 1961: see Thomp-
son v. Schmitt, 115 Tex. 53, 274 S.W. 554 (1925). (States are apparently hostile to busi-
ness trusts.) There is another group of states in which the legal status of the business trust
is in doubt for various reasons. These include, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan,
Mississippi and Ohio. A discussion of the problems in each of these states appears in
16 Bus. LAW. 900, 905 (1961).
38a. See Hart v. Seymour, 147 Ill. 598, 35 N.E. 246 (1893) (early decision on business
trusts) ; Tyson v. Commissioner, 68 F.2d 584 (1934) (real estate trust in Illinois); Weiss-
man, A New Look at Business Trusts, 49 ILL. B.J. 744 (1961) (recent developments and
potential problems of REITs in Illinois).
39. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 182, §§ 1-14 (1958).
40. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, §§ 171-174 (1941).
41. Newsletter to members of the National Association of Real Estate Investment Funds
(NAREIF) compiled by Robert M. Burr, Executive Director, and dated April 15, 1962.
42. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 6138A (1962).
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Oklahoma and Wisconsin. The Appendix lists the 67 REITs, the place
of their formation and their identifying characteristic.43 Of course, the
state of formation of a REIT does not necessarily indicate nor limit the
REIT's principal place of business. Many of the trusts hold properties
or mortgages in many states. The large number of REITs that were
formed under Massachusetts law indicates a preference for the estab-
lished doctrines and rules of Massachusetts' business trust law rather
than any particular desire on the part of these REITs to do business in
Massachusetts. For some REITs the only contact with Massachusetts
(state of formation of the trust) is a mailing address at a Boston law
firm. This has been done even where the state in which that particular
REIT planned to do its principal business allowed REITs to be formed."
There is at present one area of business trust law that is openly in
conflict. It is the state "Blue Sky" laws and the state business trust
laws. The various state security commissions are fearful that unless
the investors maintain considerable control over the trustees, the trustees
will become a self-perpetuating management group.4" In contrast to
this policy are the common law and statutes of many states which say
that the shareholder is liable as a partner for the debts and obligations
of the trust if the shareholder-beneficiary exercises substantial control
over the trustees.46 The regulations under sections 856, 857 and 858 are
silent, except for allowing elections of trustees and terminating the
trust,47 as to what control shareholders will have, or should have, over
the trustees. The Midwest Securities Commissioners' Association in
March 196148 (Midwest Rules) and the California Commissioner of
Corporations in May 1961 adopted requirements concerning real estate
investment trusts to be regulated by them, which give the investor-
shareholder the power to elect and remove the trustee, amend the trust
43. The only recent attempt to list and categorize REITs is to be found in the Feb-
ruary 12, and February 19, 1962, issues of Barron's National Business and Financial Weekly
in an article by J. Richard Elliot, Jr., entitled, More Room at the Top? (The author is
unaware of the exact number of REITs being formed and the number changes rapidly.)
44. Several mortgage trusts doing their principal business in Florida have formed
their trusts in Massachusetts. This is also true of trusts doing business exclusively in New
York. Some of the newly created trusts in New York, despite the new law in New York
allowing REITs to be formed, continue to create their trusts under Massachusetts law.
45. Cowett, Developments in State Regulation oj Securities, 16 Bus. LAW. 897 (1961).
See also Committee on Partnerships & Unincorporated Business Ass'ns, Real Estate Invest-
ment Trusts, 16 Bus. LAW. 900, 907 (1961) ; Wheat & Armstrong, Regulation of Securities
of Real Estate Investments, 16 Bus. LAW. 919, 925 (1961).
46. Wheat & Armstrong, supra note 45, at 926. See also Weissman, supra note 38a, at
747.
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(d)(1) (1962).
48. The Midwest Securities Commissioners' Association is composed of the Securities
Commissioners of Arizona, California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas and Wis-
consin. The statements of the Association are not binding on any state unless expressly
adopted by that state, but the Association's statements are often adopted by the member
states, thus they are important to note.
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indenture and terminate the trust.49 In October 1961 these shareholder
powers were relaxed somewhat,50 but under some state laws these require-
ments may endanger the legal existence of the trust and turn it into a
partnership." A partnership cannot qualify under the Real Estate In-
vestment Trust Act. 2 The Treasury Department appears to maintain
that the control required by the "Midwest Rules" is not too much control
for the purposes of sections 856-858 of the Internal Revenue Code and no
disqualification will result from this particular part of the "Midwest
Rules." 8 Of course, individual states may find themselves in contra-
dictory positions unless the business trust laws are made to conform
to the apparent liberality of the federal act. One writer maintains that
the power to select or remove the trustees would subject the beneficiaries
to general liability under the laws'of jurisdictions that have adopted the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act.14
C. Congressional and Lobbyist Intent
What did Congress intend when it passed the Real Estate Invest-
ment Trust Act? The Committee Report opens with the statement, "H.R.
12559 (Public Law 86-779) provides substantially the same tax treat-
ment for real estate investment trusts as present law provides for regu-
lated investment companies." 5 Congress, apparently, wanted to create
"mutual funds" for real estate. All of section II, entitled "Reasons
For The Bill," is put in terms of equating real estate investment trusts
and mutual funds (regulated investment companies) from the investors'
point of view.5 6 The two principal reasons given for the bill are (1) to
open real estate investments to small investors, and (2) to provide private
49. The "Midwest Rules" are discussed by Robert M. Burr, Executive Director of
NAREIF, in Real Estate Investment Funds, Vol. 3, No. 9 NATIONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTOR
(Sept. 1961).
50. The Newsletter attached to Vol. 4, No. 1 NATIONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTOR (Jan.
1962) notes the changes. See also 50 ILL. B.J. 570, 584 (1962) for a discussion of the
changes.
51. "It is plain that even states which otherwise recognize business trusts and afford
them limited liability will impose personal liability on shareholders and treat the enterprise
as a partnership in additional respects if too much power resides in the shareholders." Com-
mittee on Partnerships & Unincorporated Business Ass'ns, supra note 45 at 907.
52. Sections 856-858 of Int. Rev. Code of 1954 are explicitly applicable only to trusts
that meet the basic requirements of Section 856.
53. "Some doubt as to the effect of the requirements regarding shareholders' rights as
to removal of the trustees, amendments to the declaration of trust and termination of the
trust have arisen by reason of the language of the Proposed Treasury Regulations on
REITs; however, the Treasury Department has advised that such limited controls do not
conflict with the Proposed Treasury Regulations." Wheat & Armstrong, supra note 45, at
926.
54. Roberts, Real Estate Investment Trust-New Tax Saving Opportunity for In-
vestors, U. So. CAL. 1961 TAx INST. 27, 43.
55. 4 CCH 1962 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 4099A, at 44308. Congressmen Mills, Byrnes
and Keogh spoke for the passage of the bill essentially because it would equalize real
estate trusts with security trusts (mutual funds). 106 CONG. REc. 15017 (1960).
56. See CCH 1962 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1 4099A, at 44308.
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capital for the real estate market. The Committee is careful to point
out that "passive investments" are what are being encouraged, and "the
active operation of business" is not meant to come within the tax ad-
vantages of the Act.5T
Aside from the specific income and investment policies discussed
later in this paper, the Committee is careful to use as its model of an
acceptable real estate investment trust, the Massachusetts or business
trust as it had come to be used. The Committee states that, "the general
requirements include provisions that the trusts be managed by trustees,
have transferable shares or certificates of beneficial interest, and that
they be a type of organization which would be taxed as an ordinary
domestic corporation in the absence of the provisions of this bill." '58
It is clear from this statement that the Committee had the Massachusetts
or business trust in mind when passing the Act.59 Congress intended
that the real estate investment trusts be "publicly held" and every safe-
guard from an absolute minimum number to percentage interests was
employed by the Committee to insure that there would be no abuse of
the tax advantages by groups or persons that the Act was not meant
to aid.60
The intention of the lobbying interests was very similar to that
of Congress. Beginning about 1948, trustees of several Boston real
estate trusts sought an amendment to the tax code so that their form
of investment would be treated similarly to the mutual funds; they
hoped that investor interest in real estate would be as meteoric as the
rise in investor interest in "mutual funds."61 From the outset, these
lobbying trustees were thinking in terms of "publicly held" trusts so
that they were not opposed to a large minimum number of shareholders.
At the same time, the lobbying trustees were hoping for a similar
management-trustee relationship to that which exists between the mutual
funds and the brokerage houses.62 The Act, on its face, was essentially
what the Boston group had been seeking. The proposed regulations
issued by the Treasury Department to interpret these sections of the
57. "In addition, your committee has also taken care to draw a sharp line between
passive investments and active operation of business, and has extended the regulated in-
vestment company type of tax treatment only to income from the passive investments of
real estate investments trusts." Id. at 44309.
58. Ibid.
59. See previous definition of the United States Supreme Court, quoted in Hecht v.
Malley, 265 U.S. 144 (1924).
60. Congressman Keogh stated, "The bill has been carefully drawn to prevent its
use by speculators or by those who might try to use it to get this 'pass-through' treatment
for income from active business operations, as contrasted with passive investment income."
106 CONG. R c. 15018 (1960).
61. Gardiner, Real Estate Investment Trusts, 100 TRUSTS & ESTATES 614 (1961) dis-
cusses the intentions and purposes of the "Boston Trustees."
62. Although this will be discussed later in this paper, I would like to point out now
that it was natural for the trustees to expect that their relationship in REITs would be
similar to those of trustees in regulated investment trusts.
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Internal Revenue Code, and then in April, 1962 the final regulations,
were for the most part a disappointment to the lobbying trustees.83
II. TAx ASPECTS OF SECTIONS 856-858
In order to understand the problem in Real Estate Investment
Trusts, we must pause and look at the federal tax aspects and require-
ments for REITs.
As to tax advantages, the REIT does not pay an income tax on
dividends distributed to its beneficiaries, provided that it distributes
at least 90% of its ordinary taxable income.os Any amount in excess
of the 90% which is retained by the trust is subject to standard corporate
income tax. 3b The REIT income is thus passed on to the beneficiaries
withoat the necessity of paying a corporate income tax. The distributions
are ordinary income to the beneficiaries. Capital gains of the trust, if
distributed, are taxed at the beneficiary level as long term capital gains.63c
In this manner, the vast majority of REIT income is taxed only once,
at the beneficiary level, rather than twice as is the case with corpora-
tions. However, REIT dividends are not eligible for the usual dividend
deduction at.the taxpayer level63d
On the organization level a REIT must be an:
1. Unincorporated trust or association; and
2. Managed by one or more trustees; and have
3. Beneficial ownership evidenced by shares or certificates of bene-
ficial interest which are transferable; and
4. Shares held by 100 or more persons; and it must not be
5. A personal holding company; and
6. Holding property primarily for the sale to customers. 4
There are several asset and income requirements that a REIT must
meet, and it might be helpful to compare these requirements with those
of regulated investment companies. The gross income requirement of
regulated investment companies is basically simple; at least 90% of
gross income must be interest, dividends and gains; gains from securities
held less than three months must be less than 30% of gross income. 5
The gross income requirements of REIT's breakdown into three
categories:
63. See the N.Y. Times, April 30, 1962, p. 40, col. 3, for the statement of Joseph W.
Lund, President of NAREIF.
63a. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 857(a)(1), (b) (2) (C).
63b. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 857(b) (1).
63c. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 857(b)(3)(B).
63d. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 857(c).
64. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a).
65. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 851-855.
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1. At least 75% of the trust gross income must be derived from:
a. rents from real property;
b. interest on obligations secured by mortgages on real prop-
erty, or on land contracts, or on other interests in real property;
c. gains from sale or disposition of real property including land
contracts, other interests and mortgages;
d. dividends or other distributions on gain from sale or other
disposition of shares or beneficial interests in other real estate invest-
ment trusts which meet the requirements of sections 856-858; and
e. abatements and refunds of real property taxes.66
2. At least another 15% of gross income of the trust must be
derived from real property (real estate assets) or from sources from which
a regulated investment company would be required to derive 90% of its
income. 7 This allows the REIT to have 15% of its gross income
from dividends, interest or gains from the sale of securities, or if it
chooses from real estate assets that were listed above. These two in-
come tests allow the REIT to have 10% of its income from non-
qualifying sources, thus giving a safety margin.
3. Less than 30% of gross income may be gains on securities held
less than six months and gains on real property held less than four years,
unless compulsorily or involuntarily converted.68
It is sufficient to say that these three gross income tests guarantee
that the REIT will be investing in real estate or real estate interests
and will enter into very few short term transactions. The income tests
("75%," "15%," and "30%") go hand in hand with the asset limita-
tions to achieve what Congress intended when it passed the Real
Estate Investment Trust Act.69
Regulated investment companies have rather complex asset require-
ments designed to insure diversification and prevent control of any one
corporation by the "mutual fund. 7 ' The asset requirements of REITs
are simpler in one respect and more complex in another. The two asset
tests for REIT's are:
1. At the close of each quarter of the taxable year of the trust at
least 75% of the value of the total assets must be represented by "real
estate assets"; 71 and
2. Not more than 25% of the value of the trust's assets can be
represented by securities (other than those mentioned in (1) above),
66. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c) (3).
67. TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c) (2).
68. TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c) (4).
69. See 4 CCH 1962 STAND. FED. TAX REP. ff 4099A, for the Ways and Means Com-
mittee explanation of the above sections of the TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954.
70. TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 851(b).
71. TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c) (5) (A).
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and in meeting this 25% test only those securities can be included
which do not represent more than 5% of the assets of the trust in any
one security and not more than 10% of the outstanding voting securities
of the issuer.7"
The term "real estate assets" is defined as including fee owner-
ship, co-ownership of land or improvements thereon, interests and
mortgages on real property, shares in other qualifying real estate invest-
ment trusts, but not mineral, oil, or gas royalty interests. 78 The "75%
test" also allows for the inclusion of cash, cash items, and government
securities as allowable assets.74 It is both apparent and justifiable that
the regulations distinguish personal property which is leased together
with real property as not qualifying for inclusion in the term "real estate
assets," which along with cash, cash items and government securities,
make up the 75% test.75 The regulations set out a list of examples of
these non-qualifying items. 6
The first test (75%) is perfectly reasonable and easy to under-
stand, but the second test (25%) is both unnecessary and could prove
to be most confusing since it takes the regulated investment company
asset test and applies it out of context to REITs.17 A thirty-day grace
period is allowed in each quarter in order that the REIT may readjust
its assets if it has failed to meet one of the above tests; if it fails to
do so it is subject to the corporate income tax.7
Probably the single most complex and controversial aspect of the
Real Estate Investment Trust Act is section 856(d) which defines "Rents
from Real Property," which is one item that goes into the "75%" and
"15%" tests of gross income. The statute provides that "rents from
real property include rents from interests in real property but does not
include": (1) rent dependent on income or profits; 79 (2) rents from
"related" tenants ° and; (3) rent where the trust furnishes services or
"manages" the property.8' Presumably all other rents from interests in
real property (as defined by local law) can be included in "rents from
real property." A detailed look at each of these exclusions is necessary
since they are an area of present conflict and probably will be the basis
of a great deal of future litigation.
72. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 856(d) (5) (B).
73. ITNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 856(c) (6) (B) and 856(c) (6) (C).
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2(d) (iii) (1962).
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4 (1962).
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b) (1962).
77. Roberts, Real Estate Investment Trust-New Tax Saving Opportunity for In-
vestors, U. So. CAL. 1961 TAx INST. 27, 54.
78. ITNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(b) (5) (B).
79. I NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(d) (1).
80. IT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 856(d)(2).
81. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(d) (3).
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(1) The first of the excluded types of rental income is designed
to avoid any profit-sharing with the tenant. The statute states that
"if the determination of such amount [rent] depends in whole or in
part on the income or profits derived by any person from such prop-
erty," excluding from this rents "based on . . .fixed . . . percentages of
receipts or sales," the "rent" cannot be included in "rent from real
property" for purposes of sections 856(c)(2) and 856(c)(3).12 The
report of the Ways and Means Committee broadens the above limitation
to the extent that it states it is immaterial if a lease is based upon a
fixed percentage of sales or receipts whether or not these amounts are
adjusted for federal, state and local sales taxes.8 The Committee in-
tended to show that the purpose of this exclusion was to avoid profit-
sharing, but not to prevent or exclude rents based upon reasonable
contracts calling for a percentage of gross sales with allowances for
returns and differences in products to be sold by the tenant.8 4
Proposed Regulation 1.856-4(b) (1) contained two controversial
statements. The proposed regulations stated that if the trust enters into
a lease with a tenant that is not based solely upon a fixed sum, and
the tenant in turn enters into a sublease "which provides for a rental
based in whole or in part on the income or the profit of the sublessee,
the entire amount of the rent received by the trust from the prime
tenant with respect to such property is disqualified as 'rents from real
property.' " This proposed regulation stretched the "indirectly" of
section 856(d)(1) considerably beyond what is necessary to prevent
profit sharing between the trust and the tenant. If the REIT entered
into a perfectly allowable lease with a tenant, based upon a percentage
of gross sales, and the tenant in turn sublets one department or store on
a participation in profits basis, under the proposed regulations the entire
rental income from this property would be excluded from the "75%"
test. The final regulations have relaxed this overly stringent requirement
by adding the following language: "[I]f, considering the lease and all
the surrounding circumstances, the arrangement does not conform with
normal business practices, but is in reality used as a means of basing
the rent or income or profit" the rent would be disqualified as "rent
82. INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(d) (1).
83. "An exception is provided for amounts based on a fixed percentage or percentages
of receipts or sales of the lessee (whether or not adjusted for such items as returned mer-
chandise, or federal, state, or local sales taxes). It is not intended to disqualify rents under
situations where the lease provides for differing percentages of receipts or sales from
different departments or from separate floors of a retail store, for example, so long as each
percentage is fixed at the time of entering into the lease." 4 CCH 1962 STAND. FED. TAX
RE. ff 4099A, at 44312. See also McCarthy, Tax Considerations in the Purchase of Real
Estate, TuL. U. 1961 TAx INST. 659, 696.
84. "Furthermore, where a fixed rental is agreed to and the agreement also calls for
a percentage of the lessee's net profit in excess of a specific amount (usually determined
before deducting the fixed rental and sometimes called 'overage rents'), neither the fixed
rental nor the additional amount will qualify as 'rent from real property.'" Proposed
Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4, 26 Fed. Reg. 607 (1961).
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from real property.""5 While not clarifying the situation completely,
the new regulations do make it clear that only "profit sharing" lease
arrangements that are not generally used will be attacked under this
section. It awaits further clarification by the Internal Revenue Service
to see just what will be acceptable to them and what will be too much
"profit sharing" through the subtenant.
The last sentence of Proposed Regulation 1.856-4(b) (1) disqualified
rents merely by reason of the existence of a lease provision that provided
for additional "overage rents" based upon a tenant's net profit beyond
a set amount.86 This section was questionable because it appeared to
disqualify rent which was not dependent on "income or profits derived
by any person" and the statute disqualified only such amounts as are
"received or accrued, ' 87 while the proposed regulation attempted to dis-
qualify such amounts merely on the basis of the existence of a lease
provision which may or may not generate a receipt or accrual. The final
regulations have done away with the problem in that the existence of an
"overage rent" provision does not prima facie disqualify all rents under
the lease from being included in "rents from real property."8 If the
"overage rent" provision does not generate any income the REIT will
be able to include all of the rental under the lease as "rent from real
property."8 9 This will allow the REIT to enter into more flexible leases
allowing for greater participation in the future growth of a particular
property. If the subsequent growth is so dynamic the REIT may well
be willing to give up the inclusion of this particular rental in "rent from
real property" in order to receive the greater return, this participation
in the growth of the property need not disqualify the REIT from the
benefits of sections 856-858, because that would depend on the nature
of the other investments and whether or not even with this particular
non-qualifying rent the REIT would come within the provisions of the
Act 10
(2) The second type of excluded rental income is that which is
received from a lessee in which the trust has a substantial interest.
The test of a substantial interest is 10% whether a corporation (via
stock)"' or a person not a corporation (via assets or net profit).92 This
section is redundant and confusing to this writer in that if the trust
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(1) (1962).
86. See note 84 supra.
87. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(d) (2).
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(1) (1962).
89. "However, where the amount received or accrued for a taxable year under such
an agreement includes only the fixed rental, the determination of which does not depend in
whole or in part on the income or profits derived by the lessee, such amount may qualify
as 'rents from real property.'" Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(1) (1962). (Emphasis added.)
90. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c) (3).
91. INrT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(d) (2) (A).
92. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(d) (2) (B).
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owns 10% or more in the securities of a particular corporation, whether
a tenant or not, the trust has not met the asset requirement of sec-
tion 856(c)(5)(B) and would be disqualified from the benefits of the
Real Estate Investment Trust Act.9 3  It seems of little use and con-
sequence that the rental income from this "controlled" corporation or
person would also not be considered as "rent from real property." This
confusion resulted because income tests of regulated investment com-
panies were arbitrarily applied to REITs."
(3) The third type of excluded rental income arises when the
trustee performs too many services and ceases being passive,95 and when
the independent contractor is not "independent" enough. The REIT
is not allowed to supply services directly to the tenants, but the REIT
must use the services of the independent contractor.9 7 If the trust fails
to do this the rent is excluded from "rent from real property."9 " Most
commentators have criticized the proposed regulations under this sec-
tion.9 These commentators argued that the proposed regulations are
so restrictive that the REIT would have to enter into net leases with
the independent contractor "or all employees in the building must be
the employees of the independent contractor who manages or operates
the property."' 00 The final regulations have made some important
changes.' 01
Under the proposed regulations, the independent contractor was
not allowed to be a tenant of the REIT or more accurately, the rent
from the independent contractor could not be included in "rent from
real property."'" This seemed somewhat harsh to the extent that if
the transaction is an "arm's length arrangement," this relationship is
probably all that Congress meant to require. In most real estate
93. "[Nlot more than 25 per cent of the value of its assets is represented by securities
(other than those includible under subparagraph (A)) for purposes of this calculation limited
in respect of any one issuer to an amount not greater in value than 5 per cent of the
value of the total assets of the trust and to not more than 10 per cent of the outstanding
voting securities of such issuer." This redundancy is also noted in Kilpatrick, Taxation of
Real Estate Investment Trusts and Their Shareholders, 39 TAXas 1042, 1050 (1961).
94. Treas, Reg. § 1.856-2(d) (2) (1962) notes this problem, but does not try to resolve
it.
95. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(d),(3).
96. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 856(d) (3) (A) and 856(d) (3) (B).
97. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(3) (1962).
98. Treas. Reg.. § 1.856-4(b) (1962).
99. Vol. 3, No. 9 NATIONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTOR 29 (Sept. 1961); Car, Federal Tax
Aspects of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 16 Bus. LAW, 934, 938 (1961); Kilpatrick,
Taxation of Real Estate Investment Trusts and Their Shareholders, 39 TAXES 1042, 1050
(1961). Wolder, Real Estate Investment Trusts, 39 TAxEs 664, 669 (1961) discusses what
was expected before the proposed regulations were released.
100. McCarthy, Tax Considerations in the Purchase of Real Estate, TuL. U. 1961 TAx
INST. 659, 697.
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b) (1962).
102. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(3), 26 Fed. Reg. 607, 608 (1961). "Thus, for
example, the trust may not receive any dividends or rent from the independent contractor."
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management arrangements today, the independent contractor or man-
ager does occupy space in the building under its supervision, and this
has been considered a wise policy in that it insures more complete super-
vision. °3 The absence of a reference to this situation in the final regu-
lations leads this author to believe that this would now be allowable.0
The single most criticised sentence in the proposed regulations
was in Proposed Regulation 1.856-4(b)(3), which said, "In addition,
maintenance and repairs of the trust property, the costs of which would
be deductible under Section 162, must be controlled and paid for by an
independent contractor." The proposed regulations allowed the trust
to make capital expenditures, make leases and deal with taxes, insur-
ance and interest, but the above quoted sentence apparently required the
independent contractor to pay for repairs. 0 5 One writer stated: "This
provision appears to have no statutory basis, nor does there appear to
be any policy reason for it."'0 6 It would be unrealistic to require the
burden of repairs to be borne by the contractor since this would in-
evitably lead to a conflict of interest between the parties.0 7 This prob-
lem was resolved by final Regulation 1.856-4(b)(3)(d), which clearly
states that "the trustees may establish rental terms, choose tenants,
enter into and renew leases, and deal with taxes, interest, and insurance,
relating to the trust's property. The trustees may also make capital ex-
penditures with respect to the trust's property (as defined in Sec-
tion 263) and may make decisions as to repairs of the trust's property
(of the type which would be deductible under Section 162), the cost
of which may be borne by the trust." (Emphasis supplied.) This regu-
lation clarified what was becoming a serious problem to the REIT
trustees and to the independent contractors who were managing the
REIT property.
The independent contractor is carefully defined by the regulations
to be a person or corporation who does not own 35% of the shares of
the REIT or a person or corporation which is not "owned" (35%)
directly or indirectly by persons who own 35% of the REIT. °8  Sec-
tion 318 applies to section 356 with the modification that 10% is sub-
stituted for 50% in terms of control to insure that the independent
contractor be independent of the people who own the beneficial shares
in the REIT. This means that individuals who own 35% of the shares
of trust cannot each have a 10% interest in any corporation that has
a 35% interest in the independent contractor.' °9
103. Vol. 3, No. 9 NATIONAL RsAL ESTATE INVESTOR 29 (Sept. 1961).
104. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b) (3) (1962) states in the last sentence: "Thus, for ex-
ample, the trust may not receive any dividends from the independent contractor." Rents
are no longer included in this sentence.
105. See note 102 supra.
106. Kilpatrick, supra note 99.
107. Id. at 1051.
108. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-4(b)(3)(ii) (1962).
109. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(d)(3)(B).
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It would seem appropriate at this point to discuss one other con-
troversial aspect of the regulations; the next to the last sentence in
Regulation 1.856(d)(1) states that: "a trustee of real estate invest-
ment trust may not be an officer or employee of, or have any direct or
indirect proprietary interest in, any independent contractor which
furnishes or renders services pertaining to the trust property, or manages
or operates such property." While this limitation on trustees may be
desirable, it is neither required by the statute nor was it probably in-
tended by Congress in passing the Real Estate Investment Trust Act."'
It certainly was not expected by those seeking passage of the Act."'
Congress had the general intention to create mutual funds for real estate,
and no express provision exists in sections 856-858 which limits those
connected with the independent contractor from being trustees of the
REIT. It is doubtful that Congress meant that the trustees could not
be connected with the independent contractor. Support for this view
is found when one looks at the situation in regulated investment com-
panies." 2 The general rule is for the mutual fund officers to be con-
nected with the advisory corporation or the brokerage house that collects
the buying and selling commissions or charges an advisory fee."8 The
definition of "independent contractor" does not preclude anyone from
also being a trustee; this definition merely puts a limitation on the per-
centage interests that the REIT owners have in the independent con-
tractor and a percentage limitation that the independent contractor can
have in the REIT.
Both historically and practically, the trustees of "business trusts"
dealing in real estate have usually been connected in some way with
the management corporation or partnership. Generally this leads to
intelligent management, and in the event that the trustee abused his
dual position he would have violated his fiduciary duty and could be held
liable and removed from office with the proper action."' 4 Since the
trustees can be removed by the shareholders, he could be removed by a
simple vote without resorting to court action." 5 Of course, there are
110. The House Committee on Ways and Means stated: "The independence of the
contractor is assured by providing that: The trust may not receive any income from the
contractor; the contractor may not own more than 35 per cent interest in the trust; and
not more than 35 per cent of the stock (or voting power) of a corporate contractor (or
interest in the assets and profits if not a corporation) can be held by a person or persons
holding a 35 per cent or greater interest in the trust." 4 CCH 1962 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
4099A, at 44310.
111. Grant, Real Estate Investment Trusts, 100 Tausrs & ESTATES 766 (1961); Vol. 3,
No. 9 NATIONAL REAL ESTATE INMSTOR 29 (Sept. 1961); and Carr, supra note 99, at 935.
See also Kilpatrick, supra note 99.
112. Investment Company Act § 10(a), 54 Stat. 806 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10
(1958).
113. See Note, The Mutual Fund and Its Management Company: An Analysis of Busi-
ness Incest,71 YALE L.J. 137 (1961).
114. A discussion of possible remedies appears in Kilpatrick, Taxation of Real Estate
Investment Trusts and Their Shareholders, 39 TAXEs 1042 (1961).
115. See earlier section of this paper under The Business or Massachusetts Business
Trust.
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good reasons why the number of trustees who can be affiliated with the
independent contractors should be limited."' Section 10(a) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 allows 60% of the trustees of a mutual
fund to serve as officers or employees of an independent contractor.
This author would favor a limitation that 40% of the trustees of a REIT
be allowed to be affiliated with the independent contractor, but it must
be pointed out that only Congress can set any limit, since it is not the
power of an administrative agency to amend a law of Congress.' As
section 856 of the Internal Revenue Code now appears, the author sees
no justification for prohibiting a person affiliated with the independent
contractor from serving as a trustee; on the contrary, the history and
intent of Congress was to allow this type of activity and dual
relationship." 8
III. USES OF REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
In the brief history of REITs, there have developed six distinct
types of REITs that have been marketed to the public. These are
(1)"blankcheck" trusts; (2) exchange trusts; (3) purchasing trusts;
(4) mixed trusts; (5) existing trusts; and (6) mortgage trusts." 9 These
six types of trusts exhibit the great ingenuity of the real estate com-
munity to develop variations of REITs."0
A. "Blankcheck" Trusts
The "blankcheck" trusts are very simple to understand. The REIT
states in its prospectus that it will invest in real estate that meets
a number of highly desirable characteristics, but there is no mention of
specific properties, nor of any contract to buy any particular property.
This type of trust has been marketed to the public strictly on the repu-
tations and names of the promoters and proposed trustees. These "blank-
116. There always remains a problem of obtaining information on the REIT's activi-
ties, and having some "independent" trustees to watch out for the shareholders' interest
would be beneficial. Also having a majority of "insider" trustees may be pushing human
weaknesses to limits that' are not advisable. On the other hand, it would be beneficial to
the REIT to have some "insiders" as trustees.
117. This proposition is so well ingrained in American jurisprudence that it requires
no citation. See Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 (1945) ; 1 MERTEN,
FEDERAL, TAXATION § 3.21 (1962).
118. For a general discussion of the tax aspects of REITs see 33 ROCKY MT. L. REV.
364 (1961); Carr, Federal Tax Aspects of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 16 Bus. LAW.
934 (1961); Kilpatrick, supra note 114. For a pessimistic view of REITs see 1961 WASH.
U.L.Q. 436.
119. For a general discussion of the uses of REITs see Barron's National Business
and Financial Weekly, February 12 and 19, 1962. See also Sandison, REITs Spark Interest
of Tax Wise Investors in Real Estate Market, 16 J. TAXATION 242, 244 (1962).
120. For obvious reasons, I do not discuss the relative merits or disadvantages of
particular REITs. I have attempted to generalize my discussion so that the REITs could
be placed in categories, and in each category I have named one or two trusts in existence
of each type. My selection of REITs as examples is for demonstration purposes, and it is
in no way to be construed as a preference of any particular REIT.
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check" trusts are usually led by men of great integrity in the community
who for a number of reasons do not want the REIT committed to any
specific real estate at its formation. Thus far, this has been the most
common form of REIT marketed to the public.12'
One of the first and largest REITs to get clearance from the Secu-
rities Exchange Commission was the Greenfield Real Estate Investment
Trust, which bears the name of Albert M. Greenfield, a highly respected
real estate operator in Philadelphia. In March of 1961 the Greenfield
Real Estate Investment Trust offered, through Drexel and Company,
500,000 shares at $20 a share, and the issue was oversubscribed in a
brief period. As of May 31, 1962, the Greenfield Real Estate Investment
Trust was being traded over the counter at a range of 134 bid-14Y2
asked. 12 2 The reason for this sharp decline in price is that the Green-
field REIT trustees have only invested in one parcel of real estate as yet.
The money that was raised in the sale of shares, about $9,500,000, is all
in treasury bills and cash,'123 except for the single investment which in-
volved a cash outlay of approximately $350,000.124 It is not any easy
matter to invest many millions of dollars in real estate that is meant to
have a long term investment future. Proper selection and investigation
takes time, but in the meantime, thousands of investors are getting little
return on their money and contrary to what they hoped, they have only
a minor interest in any real estate.
The preceding case study points out the basic weakness in "blank-
check" trusts. These REITs may be a good investment (or a poor one)
in the long run, but at least for a number of years the investors will
be disillusioned about what they bought. Since with a "blankcheck"
trust there is little to disclose, the SEC disclosure requirements are of
little value to potential investors.'25 The prospectuses of these trusts are
so general that a careful reading discloses that the trustees can invest
in almost anything, or not invest at all. When one invests in a "blank-
check" trust, he is investing in the names and potential talents of the
trustees.'26 The limitations that appear in these "blankcheck" REITs
121. Thirty-three out of 67 known REITS are of the "blankcheck" type. The figure
of 67 REITs includes 10 existing trusts, so that we can see that the percentage of "blank-
check" REITs that have been recently formed is very high, representing 58% of all the
new trusts.
122. Vol. 4, No. 6 NATIONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTOR 13 (June 1962).
123. Barron's National Business and Financial Weekly, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 5.
124. Greenfield Real Estate Investment Trust acquired a shopping center in Drexel
Hill, Pennsylvania. This transaction is noted in Vol. 4, No. 4 NATIONAL REAL ESTATE
IN VESTOR 12 (April 1962).
125. It is suggested that the reader obtain a copy of the prospectus of any "blank-
check" trust and read it for a study in saying nothing in 30 to 40 pages. The SEC does
not allow optimistic statements of intention, so that the counsel for the "blankcheck"
REITs have been careful to allow any type of investment or action that the Real Estate
Investment Trust Act would allow.
126. A number of writers maintain that this is "the way" to invest in a REIT. See
Swesnik, Realty Investment Trusts and the Potential Investors, The Commercial and
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are those usually imposed by statute or "blue sky" laws. Of course, the
failure of the Treasury to issue promptly final regulations of sections
856-858 was also a serious factor in the delay in investing by the "blank-
check" trusts. It is likely that the "blankcheck" REITs will now move
ahead with their investments much more rapidly than they have done in
the past.
B. Exchange Trusts
Exchange trusts are trusts created by the exchange of beneficial-
shares of the REIT for interests in existing real estate. If the event is
a taxable event, the REIT would get a new basis for depreciation, but if
section 351 applies, 27 then the REIT must accept the basis of the trans-
ferring parties. Of course, from the individual's point of view, section
351, allowing non-recognition of gain or swaps, is a most beneficial situa-
tion. This allows small or medium sized real estate holders to band to-
gether and come out with something quite different, and not realize any
taxable gain in the occurrence.
This technique was used by the Liberty Real Estate Trust which
registered $25,000,000 in shares with the SEC, and as of the first of the
year had exchanged $6,162,522 in shares for assets worth $11,415,936
with an equity value after mortgages of $6,162,936. Its portfolio is
extremely varied and includes office buildings, commercial and apart-
ment buildings, motels, bowling alleys and mortgages. The individual
investors gain a great deal from this exchange since they now have di-
versified investments and ready marketability for their shares.
Financial Chronicle, April 6, 1961, p. 11. See also Flexner, Future of Real Estate Invest-
ment Trusts Hinges on Able Management, 100 TRUSTS & ESTATES 542 (1961). For this same
thesis directed at the investment public, see Real Estate Investment Trusts, Changing
Times, Jan. 1962, pp. 27, 30.
127. Section 351(a) provides: "General Rule-No gain or loss shall be recognized if
property is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for
stock or securities in such corporation and immediately after the exchange' such person
or persons are in control (as defined in Section 368(c)) of the corporation. For purposes
of this section, stock or securities issued for service shall not be considered as issued
in return for property."
The purpose of section 351 is to allow a person or persons to transfer property to a
corporation in exchange for stock without realizing a taxable gain or loss on the transfer.
For example: If A transfers real property, which at the time of transfer has a value of
$100,000, and a cost (computed after allowing for possible prior depreciation allowances)
of $50,000 to A, A would not have to recognize the gain of $50,000 at the time of transfer,
provided that A controlled the B corporation. To be in control of the corporation A
must own, immediately after the transfer at least 80 per cent of the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 per cent of the total
number of shares of all other classes of stock. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1 (1962). However, the
basis of the stock in A's hands would be $50,000, so that A would realize only when he
sells his stock in B corporation. If section 351 applies to transfers creating REITs, the
REIT shareholders would not have to realize any gain on the transfer of real property
to the REIT in exchange for the shares of the REIT, provided that the control require-
ment was met.
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The popularity of this type of trust is assured, as long as the bene-
fits of section 351 apply. The author has spoken to a number of real
estate owners who have stated that if section 351 definitely applies and
the final regulations were at all "reasonable," they will seek to form
REITs. Interest in the "exchange trust" could prove to be far beyond
expected if the Liberty Real Estate Trust is not challenged on the basis
that section 351 does not apply to the formation of REITs. The Flato
Realty Investments has registered shares for $20,000,000 for the purpose
of creating an exchange trust by June of 1962.128
C. Purchasing Trusts
The purchasing trust is a REIT organized to purchase specific real
estate, either one property or several. In filing with the SEC this form
of REIT must disclose a great deal of information about the earning
records, prospects, prices, arrangement, etc. that will reflect what the
REIT is planning on buying." This could be termed a variation of syndi-
cation, but it need not be limited, as most syndications are, to a single
property.'8 0
One small REIT was formed to serve as an alternative to syndica-
tion. This was the Gateside-Architect Building Trust, which sold 139
shares at $5,000 each for the purpose of owning one building. This may
be a complicated way to handle such a relatively small transaction, but
it does offer the safety of the Real Estate Investment Trust Act and
may offer a number of benefits in the long run. 8'
Another, and probably more appropriate, use of the purchasing
trust is the U. S. Realty. Investments, which described in detail its
proposed acquisitions in its prospectus and has proceeded to buy them
with the $6,661,975 raised from the public. U. S. Realty Investments
purchased a number of properties and has recently filed a second regis-
tration for $6,000,000 to purchase more designated properties. Thus,
from the investor's point of view, there are certain advantages: knowl-
edge of what he is investing in, diversity and the benefits of the Real
Estate Investment Trust Law. U. S. Realty Investments was selling on
May 31, 1962, at a slight premium over the amount for which it was
128. The Flato Realty Trust prospectus, dated February 13, 1962, states that in the
opinion of counsel, section 351 does apply to the formation of a REIT. It is the
opinion of this writer that section 351 does apply to the formation of REITs, but I would
not be prepared to so state in an "Opinion of Counsel" without a "Letter Ruling" from the
Tax Ruling Division of the Internal Revenue Service.
129. See Release No. 4422, Securities Act of 1933, issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on October 26, 1961.
130. The complexity of 'arranging a syndication for more than one property is what
imposes a practical limitation on the use of the syndication method for multiproperty
financing.
131. Congress is at present reviewing syndication operations and the founders of
the Gateside-Architect Building Trust are believed to have weighed this factor in the
selection of the trust method as opposed to a more usual syndication.
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issued, as compared to the "blankcheck" trusts which are generally
selling at a considerable discount.
D. Mixed Trusts
Mixed trusts are REITs that were organized with usually one
specific land or real estate purchase in mind and then coupled with
a "blankcheck" clause to cover the excess funds. This serves the purpose
of informing the public as to one property the REIT is buying and im-
plying that other properties will be of a similar nature. This is a better
situation for the investor than the total "blankcheck" trust, where there
is no way of knowing in what properties the REIT will eventually invest.
There are two conspicuous examples of this type of trust, the Wash-
ington (D.C.) Realty Investment Trust (600,000 shares at $5 per
share) and the First National Real Estate Trust (2,500,000 shares at
$10 per share). The Washington Realty Investment Trust stated in its
prospectus that it intended to use one-third (about one million dollars) of
the proceeds of the sale to acquire a specific apartment house. The remain-
der was to be later invested on a "blankcheck" basis. The First National
Real Estate Trust disclosed in its prospectus that it would acquire a
$1,700,000 apartment complex (mortgaged for $950,000) with part of
its proceeds. Again, this gives the investor an opportunity to see the
nature of the properties that will probably be invested in, while at the
same time it allows the REIT a great deal of flexibility in its future in-
vestments.
E. Existing Trusts
Existing trusts are the trusts that have proven earning capacity and
that were in existence before the passage of the Real Estate Investment
Trust Act of 1960. This type of trust offers the investor established
portfolios, established earning records, and probably conservative man-
agement.
Most conspicuous in this group is the Real Estate Investment Trust
of America which traces its existence back to 1886. The Real Estate
Investment Trust of America had over $22,000,000 worth of real estate
on its books prior to its $10,000,000 public offering in June of 1961.
These holdings are soundly diversified in thirteen states and represent
enlightened conservative management.
Another large, established REIT is the Bradley Real Estate Trust
which has announced that it will not offer any new shares to the public
until after the final regulations of the Treasury have been examined.
Even without new shares, the Bradley Real Estate Trust has over a
million shares outstanding.3 2
132. See discussion Vol. 3, No. 1 NATIONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTOR 20 (Jan. 1961).
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F. Mortgage Trusts
Mortgage trusts are a considerably different type of investment
than any of the five types listed above. 3  The mortgage trusts are set
up to hold mortgage interests, not equity interets. These trusts can vary
from very safe low yield government insured mortgages to high yield
speculative construction or second mortgages.'
One of the earliest REITs to register with the SEC was the First
Mortgage Investors, which offered one million shares at $15 a share in
September of 1961. The present price of the shares is considerably
more than this initial price. First Mortgage Investors has announced
a policy of dividing its mortgages between FHA-VA insured home loans
and development and construction loans. The government insured mort-
gages will yield roughly 5%, but this will be balanced with 10-12%
yields on development and construction loans which should give the
trust an overall yield of 8-9%. " ' The Continental Mortgage Investors
issued 1,700,000 shares at $15 per share on March 22, 1962, and was
immediately oversubscribed. Continental has announced a policy of
dividing its portfolio between government insured mortgages and con-
struction mortgages.'3 6
The Mortgage trust will undoubtedly be the first type of REIT
to attempt to issue senior securities so as to give the shareholders greater
leverage. A great deal will depend upon the cost of money since the
mortgage REIT will have a fairly fixed return, but assuming that the
REIT earns 8% and must pay 6% for borrowed capital, this leverage
could be used to make the mortgage REIT an attractive high yield in-
vestment. It is hoped that senior securities will be issued in ratios as
high as five to one over equity capital, thus giving great leverage. 37
The mortgage REITs also may be able to serve the purpose of
"warehousing" the paper of the banking insitutions. This could be
a stabilizing factor in the conventional mortgage market, such as "Fanny
May" is to the government insured market. The First Mortgage Inves-
tors hopes to become a "banking institution" on a nationwide scale and
expects that through the use of senior securities it will have sixty million
dollars available in the next two years for the purchase of mortgages. 8
A mortgage trust could well be the first open ended REITY.39 The
133. Barron's National Business and Financial Weekly, Feb. 12, 1962, pp. 3, 12.
134. For a general discussion of mortgage trusts see ibid.; Flexner, supra note 126;
22 MORTGAGE BANKER 30 (April 1962).
135. First Mortgage Investors early earning reports are noted in Vol. 4, No. 6
NATONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTOR 12 (June 1962).
136. N.Y. Times, March 22, 1962, p. 49, col. 5.
137. Barron's National Business and Financial Weekly, supra note 133; 22 MORTGAGE
BANKER 30, 31 (April 1962).
138. Barron's National Business and Financial Weekly, supra note 133.
139. Discussed in detail in the next section of this paper.
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SEC has rejected all open ended REITs to date because of the myriad
of evaluation problems, but these problems become minor when dealing
in mortgages which do have a readily establishable value depending upon
current mortgage yields on specific risks. 4" The First Mortgage In-
vestors is offering its shareholders a dividend reinvestment plan which
means that the REIT will pay dividends to those who want them this
way, in shares rather than cash. The value will be determined by the
prevailing market price for mortgages and the Real Estate Investment
Trust Act will be complied with. There is no reason why mortgage
trusts may not in the near future become hundred million dollar trusts
doing business on a nationwide scale. Yields could safely be as high as
16-18% on each equity dollar if senior securities are as widely used as
is anticipated.'
4
'
IV. THE INVESTOR AND THE REAL ESTATE
INVESTMENT TRUST TRUSTEE
In the opening section of this paper there was a discussion on
the business trust as a form of doing business. At this point, the author
would like clearly to distinguish the business trust from the corporate
form on the basis of one particular characteristic; namely, investor con-
trol of the management. In a corporation, the power to run the corpora-
tion rests in the hands of the board of directors, and the board of di-
rectors is elected by the stockholders. While the business trust appears
to have a similar arrangement, there are several important differences.
The business trust is run by the trustees. The trustees may or may
not have been elected by the beneficial certificate holders. Conceptually,
a trust is operated for the benefit of the beneficiaries, but the benefici-
aries need not have any mathematical majority control.'42 Until the
creation of REITs, there was little need to attempt to apply the so-called
"corporate democracy" ideas to the business trust, because it was as-
sumed that those who used the trust form for business knew what they
were doing and did not need special protections.
To illustrate the above remarks, the author would like to point out
that some of the REITs that have been established require an affirmative
vote of two-thirds of the beneficial certificate holders to remove a trustee,
otherwise the other trustees select who is to be a trustee. Even the Mid-
western Security Commissioners have realized that a REIT is not to
be treated like a corporation as far as voting powers are concerned; they
140. Wheat & Armstrong, Regulation of Securities of Real Estate Investments, 16 Bus.
LAW. 919, 926 (1961).
141. The theory of leverage can be used to show yields in any range from 10% to
50%, but I believe that the 16 to 18 per cent figure is reasonably attainable if senior
securities are used in the mortgage REITs.
142. Historically the beneficiaries often needed 75% or 66% control (vote) to remove
trustees. See Kilpatrick, supra note 114.
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have amended their original position and now allow the trustees to be
elected every three years instead of their original position of every
year.143 Of course, the "Midwest Rules" still require the affirmative
election of trustees by a majority vote and the REITs used in the il-
lustration above would still not qualify for the Midwestern "blue sky"
laws. 144
The exact rights and powers of shareholders in a business trust are
a matter of state law and beyond the scope of inquiry of this paper, but
it cannot be emphasized enough that a business trust is not a corpora-
tion, and although this will be said over and over again, investors buying
on exchanges and over the counter will treat them the same in their
minds, and, eventually, serious litigation will develop. 4 '
V. OPEN ENDED REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
In the discussion of mortgage trusts in the preceding sections, men-
tion was made of "open ended" trusts. There is nothing in the Internal
Revenue Code, sections 856-858, to prevent a REIT from being "open
ended." Most "mutual funds" operate on an "open ended" principle,
which means that at a fixed point in time, usually each day, the fund,
an affiliate or a subsidiary stands ready to buy or sell shares of the fund
at a price based upon an evaluation of the assets of the fund. Conceptu-
ally and legally, there is no reason why a REIT cannot undertake this
sort of activity. Thus far, the SEC has refused to allow any REIT to
set themselves up in this manner and, so that the public will not be de-
ceived, the SEC has not allowed any REIT to use the word "fund" in its
name. 46 The reason for this is a very practical one. The success of
"mutual funds" is greatly attributable to this method in that it gives
great marketability to the shares and allows for limitless growth.
The SEC is strongly opposed to "open ended" REITs because of
the practical problem of valuation.14 ' With traded stocks and bonds
there is a daily market value, but with real estate that is not likely to be
sold for many years and with no comparable market for establishing
value, how does one evaluate the dollar value of a REIT's shares on any
given day? A number of suggestions have been advanced by interested
parties which call for appraisals or estimates by either trustees or in-
143. Reported in the newsletter of Vol. 4, No. I NATIONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTOR
(Jan. 1962).
144. NAREIF has taken the position that more shareholder control is desirable. This
is reported in the N.Y. Times, April 30, 1962, p. 40, col. 3, in a statement by Joseph W.
Lund, President of NAREIF.
145. See Magruder, The Position of Shareholders in Business Trusts, 23 COLuM. L.
REV. 423 (1923).
146. This is based upon the theory that the word "fund" has come to have a specialized
meaning because of its constant use with the precedent "mutual."
147. Wheat & Armstrong, supra note 140, at 929.
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dependent appraisers, but at best these evaluations would be guesses, and
at worst these methods could be fraudulently abused.
It might prove workable to allow REITs to be "open ended" to the
extent that the REIT would offer shares on a monthly or a quarterly
price based upon reasonable appraisal value, but this could prove to
be very expensive to the REIT. 148 As far as REITs holding equity in-
terests are concerned, this writer can see no persuasive reason at present
for the SEC to reverse its position.
Because of the SEC's denial of "open ended" REITs some REITs
have attempted to "avoid" this restriction by registering more shares
than they plan to sell at the initial stages and hold these shares
for some plan of reinvestment or for a time contract investment plan.
In reality, despite the names given to these methods, it is only another
form of the initial marketing of the shares.149 There are still a limited
number of shares available and the price charged for these subsequently
acquired shares is fixed by the contract and in no way is it a reflection
of fair market value, appraisal value, supply and demand or any other
recognized method of establishing an objective price. It is a mere specu-
lation. The existence of these contracts will force the other shareholders
of the REIT to assume more of the risk and to receive less of the gain.
By way of illustration, if the shares of the REIT are initially mar-
keted at $10 a share to some investors, while others sign contracts to
buy, at their option, so many shares for $10 a share over the next six
months, and then so many shares at $10.50 over the next six month pe-
riod, this will place the risk of loss on the investor who invested $10 at
the initial offering period and the fruits to him would be diluted on a
per -share basis by the contract-time purchasers exercising his option.
As alluded to previously, mortgage trusts present a different situa-
tion in relation to "open ended" trusts. 50 The problems of valuation
are not nearly so great as with equity interests. If a mortgage REIT is
buying strictly government insured mortgages (VA, FHA) that yield
5Y4 % there is no problem of evaluation at all, and the SEC's argument
for preventing this type of REIT from being "open ended" fails com-
pletely. The mortgage market, as such, although informal, does give
daily or weekly values to dollars invested in certain debt risk situations.
If the REIT fixes the rate of return, say at 5%, then all subsequent
purchasers of shares in the REIT would be on the basis of the number
148. The REIT would have to bear the cost of the appraisals, and if the REIT owned
a number of properties and the appraisals were more than a mere sham, this could become
a very expensive procedure for the REIT.
149. Typical of these names are "divided reinvestment," "time purchase" and "contract
purchase."
150. See Flexner, supra note 126; Vol. 3, No. 1 NATIONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTOR 23
(Jan. 1961). For the potential of mortgage REITs, see Barron's National Business and
Financial Weekly, Feb. 12, 1962, pp. 3, 12.
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of dollars necessary to yield 5% on the basis of the earnings of the
REIT. For example, if the REIT originally has offered to the public at
$10 a share and subsequently earned 750 a share, subsequent investors
would have to pay $15 a share to receive the 5% return. If, on the other
hand, the REIT earned only 400 a share, then subsequent investors
would pay $8 a share to buy the limitless shares of the REIT. This
method is practical and fair to all concerned. It is to be expected that
the SEC will approve such a plan or a similar one after it revaluates its
present position. Mortgage REITs should be the first truly "open
ended" trusts doing business under the Real Estate Investment Trust
Act.
VI. REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
AND THE REAL ESTATE MARKET
Real estate in general has been becoming more of a public enter-
pri~e in the last few years. Traditionally it was an area precluded
from the small investor and often even from the medium size investors.
Diversification of risk was almost impossible without the use of large
sums of money. In the past several years, syndication has become im-
portant in real estate. Some syndicates have become public corporations,
while other closely held corporations have also "gone public." The Na-
tional Real Estate Investor now lists almost one hundred real estate
corporations that are publicly held and traded in a national market.' 51
The same magazine in a recent issue listed seventeen publicly traded
REITs. I2 It is apparent that the public is being invited into the real
estate investment field on a wide front. With the traditional high yields
in real estate and this new-found marketability and stability investors
are rapidly moving into the real estate area.53
Most of the new REITs are offering initial subscriptions of from
three to twenty-five million dollars. Thus, the REITs are starting as big
businesses that are capable of a sizable impact on the national real
estate market. As of the first of the year, there were over $230,000,000
in new shares registered or in registration with the SEC.' With the is-
suance of the final Treasury Regulations last May it is not unreasonable
to expect this figure to move to over a billion dollars in a year or two.
These figures do not even include over $50,000,000 worth of property
held by REITs in existence prior to the passage of the Real Estate In-
vestment Trust Act. 55
151. Vol. 4, No. 6 NATIONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTOR 13 (June 1962).
152. Ibid.
153. The first syndicates offered yields of about 12%, and as syndicates became more
widely accepted the yield dropped to about 10%. Real estate corporations, generally,
pay 6 to 8% yields, while the REITs dealing in equities are expected to yield about 7 to
8% on the invested dollar.
154. Robert M. Burr, Executive Director of NAREIF, has compiled a list dated Jan. 15,
1962, which was sent to all of the members of NAREIF.
155. See Appendix for a list of REITs in existence prior to 1960.
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The small investor will now have a choice of investment vehicles
into the real estate field. Of course, the probable short run prospect of
all this new money into the real estate field will lead to overpricing of
prime income properties and to a reduction of percentage yields in the
newly invested dollar. But there is a great amount of real estate in the
United States, and it is not likely that supply and demand factors will
wreck havoc on the real estate market. When one realizes that one of
Congress's avowed intentions in passing the Real Estate Investment
Trust Act was to bring private capital into the real estate market, it is
obvious that in this respect Congress will have been successful. 5 ' All
of the activity in real estate that has been generated by REITs and the
other now popular forms of real estate investment should have a long
term beneficial effect upon the growth and economy of the country. The
real estate field is ceasing to be alien to the small investor, and this will
have the effect of encouraging investments which in turn will bring sta-
bility and marketability to real estate assets.
VII. CONCLUSION
REITs are an old investment form that have been revitalized by a
change in the Internal Revenue Code. After a short period of little
activity, REITs have been organized at a rapid pace that is now increas-
ing. Each day brings increased interest in REITs. REITs are being
used in a number of ways for equity and debt interests, and it is likely
that there may develop new uses for REITs. This tremendous financial
impact on the real estate market and of investor interest in real estate
is in the hands of a few men who are serving as trustees of these REITs.
Since the new REITs are unproved and the trust form allows the trus-
tees more freedom than directors of a corporation, a great deal depends
upon the vision and integrity of the trustees.
A whole new "industry" is developing and as with anything new
there will be "growing pains." Investors must always use considerable
caution in investing in anything new and unproved, but for once the
"professionals" are attempting to get maximum protection for the in-
vestors. The "professionals" are themselves attempting to have reason-
able controls placed upon REITs so that in the long run a REIT will be
synonymous with sound investments. REITs have started off as big busi-
nesses and the future should show them becoming even bigger.
156. The House Ways and Means Committee report may be found at 4 CCH STANq
FE. TAx REP. fT 4099A, at 44308 (1962).
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APPENDIX
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
This list was made as of July 15, 1962. The following symbols are used: B
for Blankcheck, E for Existing, M for Mortgage, P for Purchasing, S for Ex-
change, and X for Mixed.
Trust
Amecana Properties Trust
American Mortgage Investors
American Realty Trust
American Southwest Realty Trust
Anaconda R.E.I. Trust
Bradley R.E. Trust
Business Property Assocs.
California Properties
California R.E.I. Trust
Century R.E.I. Trust
Chicago Dock & Canal Trust
Chicago R.E. Trustees
Columbia Realty Trust
Commercial Properties Assoc.
Commonwealth Realty Trust
Continental Mortgage Investors
Continental R.E.I. Trust
Dennis R.E.I. Trust
Denver R.E.I. Assn.
Diversified Realty Investors
Diversified R.E. Trust
Federal Realty Investment Trust
First Atlanta Realty Fund
First Continental R.E.I. Trust
First Diversified R.E. Assn.
First Mortgage Investors
First National R.E. Trust
First R.E.I. Trust of Iowa
First R.E.I. Trust of New Jersey
First Southern Realty Trust
First Union Realty
First Western R.E. Trust
Flato Realty Investments
Flato Realty Trust
Franklin Realty Trust
Gateside-Architect Bldg. Trust
General Realty Income Trust
Great Southern R.E. Trust
Greenfield R.E.I. Trust
Great Western Inv. Trust
Hawaii R.E.I. Trust
Interstate Equity
Investors Realty Trust
State of Formation
California
Massachusetts
Washington, D.C.
Texas
Florida
Massachusetts
Massachusetts
California
California
Oklahoma
Illinois
Massachusetts
Washington, D.C.
Massachusetts
Pennsylvania
Massachusetts
Maryland
New York
Colorado
Utah
New York
Washington, D.C.
Georgia
Illinois
Ohio
Massachusetts
New York
Iowa
New Jersey
Washington, D.C.
Ohio
Colorado
Texas
Texas
Pennsylvania
New York
Massachusetts
Georgia
Pennsylvania
Oklahoma
Hawaii
New York
Washington, D.C.
Type
X
M
B
B
P
E
E
B
B
B
E
E
X
E
P
M
B
B
B
B
B
X
B
B
B
M
X
B
P
B
P
B
S
S
B
P
B
B
B
B
B
X
X
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APPENDIX (Continued)
State of Formation
Lake Forest Improvement Trust
Liberty R.E. Trust
Metropolitian Realty Trust
Midwestern Mortgage Investors
National Realty Trust
Nation-Wide R.E.I. Trust
North American R.E. Trust
Pennsylvania R.E.I. Trust
Peralta Properties
Perpetual Investment Trust
Prudent Realty Inv. Trust
R.E.I. Trust of America
R.E.I. Trust of Louisiana
Sears R.E. Trust, David
Sixty Realty Trust
Southeastern R.E. Trust
Stephen Realty Investment Co.
U.S. Realty Investments
Wabash Avenue Trustees
Washington Building Trust
Washington R.E.I. Trust
Western Land Trust Fund
Western States R.E.I. Trust
Wisconsin R.E.I. Fund
Illinois
Florida
Washington, D.C.
Colorado
Massachusetts
Massachusetts
New York
Pennsylvania
California
Washington, D.C.
Pennsylvania
Massachusetts
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Massachusetts
Florida
Colorado
Ohio
Massachusetts
Massachusetts
Washington, D.C.
California
Colorado
Wisconsin
Trust Type
